South China Sea and ASEAN-Free-Samples for Students-Myassignment

Question: There is a lack of consensus in ASEAN. Why? When did it emerge? Will it be long standing? Who is behind it -finally leading up to the issue of China. What has China got to do with the lack of consensus in ASEAN and how does that relate to the South China Sea disputes? Answer: There is a lack of consensus in ASEAN? Why? The major reason for the absence of ASEANs consensus is due to the activities of China on the South China Sea (SCS). The ASEAN defense ministers were thus enable to agree on the joint statement after the meeting/forum held on Wednesday. This inability is a clear reflection of the concern of these ministers about the activity of China in the South China Sea. This remained a salient issues of discussion as well as one of great concern by nations in the meeting since it was raised by everyone. For example, it was apparent from the unanimous decision by the PAC in 2016 that Chinas activities were hurting Philippines. The Court ruled in favor of Philippines in most questions including that Chinese ships behavior were physically obstructing the vessels of Philippines and against the law. The Tribunal further awarded that the nine-dash line of China alongside the claim to historic rights in SCS were both invalid as per the international law. [1] The Meeting held in 2016 showed lack of consensus where defense Ministers had to retract their statement that recognized the activities in SCS. They had expressed their serious concern over the latest and ongoing development that had eroded trust as well as confidence, augmented tensions as well as which could have the potential of undermining peace, security as well as stability in the SCS. The retracted statement had also recognized and emphasized the significance of non-militarization as well as self-restraint in conduct of each activity, including land reclamation that could raise tensions in SCS. They further retracted the statement where they had emphasized the significance of maintaining peace, stability, security, safety as well as freedom of navigation in alongside overflight above the SCS according to the conventionally acknowledged principles of the international law including 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention) on the Law of the Sea). The ASEAN members have let the crucial economic links as well as interests with China to take frontline when working for consensus which only means that they will be sacrificing the unity on the major issues like SCS. [2] Unlike at the point of ASEAN formation in 1967 where the organizations world recognized trademark was its consensus approach where decisions were being taken by consensus, not by majority, the contemporary ASEANs decisions are solely by majority. When did it emerge? Will it be long standing? Who is behind it -- finally leading up to the issue of China? When it emerged? The lack of consensus emerged where the Southeast Asian Foreign Ministers failed to release the joint communique in Cambodias Summit in 2012 for the first time in history of ASEAN. The unity of ASEAN over SCS has remained a fraught issue for the ASEAN organization. [3] For the first time since inception, ASEAN foreign ministers, at the summit in Cambodia in 2012, failed to issue a joint communique, following a highly publicized stand-off the same year between China and the Philippines Scarborough Shoal in the SCS. The joint customary communique at the end of the high-level meeting that took place on 2016 also failed to happen in August as the statement was retracted barely hours after it had been released following the mention of Chinese illegal activities in the SCS. Will it be long standing? This lack of consensus will really be a long standing issue following the activities of China in the SCS. In absence of a leadership initiative on the part an ASEANs more neutral states makes it increasingly doubtful that ASEAN policy toward China shall change any soon. This is because ASEAN members seem to have the potential to lead the organization that can by extension establish a consensus on China. [4] Such a regional leader seems not to be here yet since it will need capacity both human and financial resources, internal commitment to undertake a leadership role as well as the buy-in of its regional as well as global neighbor. None of the ASEAN members seems to fit this decision yet or even come close to fitting it. For example, Jakarta stays the symbolic head that host the secretariat of ASEAN, yet Indonesia presently lacks the will to take the definitive leadership responsibility and role. The future of ASEAN will remain tied to rise of China. With an array of economic, military and political variances among ASEAN members, ASEAN requires a string voice among the member countries to guide both external and internal consultation, were members hope to generate on ASEAN-centric approach to issues of security and ultimate creation of consensus. In absence of a committed as well as capable ASEAN leader (s) on political-security matters, periodic eruptions of crises in SCS might continue to turn the status quo balance of power into the ASEAN chronic instability. Who is behind it -- finally leading up to the issue of China? China is behind this long standing stand-off primarily due to its activities in SCS. When the statement was released prior to retraction, it is understood that it attracted private protests from Beijing; even whereas it never mention China by name, it remained unusual for ASEAN ministers to implicitly criticize Chinese behavior or activities on Chinese soil. The diplomats have said to be the lack of consensus regarding how to refer to the South China Sea disputes. The South China Sea has remained a longstanding thorny issues for ASEAN, with various opinions amongst its ten members on how to speak to Chinas assertiveness as well as Chinas building alongside heavy arming of Chinese artificial islands in the disputed waters. The issues entail the requirement to mention the need to evade land reclamation and militarization fronted by Vietnam that is among the 4 members with competing sovereignty claims with China. China remains extremely sensitive regarding ASEAN mentioning its military capabilities expansion on such islands and some ASEAN members are concerned about the feasible repercussions of upsetting Beijing provided its economic power and military. Any attempt to reissue the statement with a softening of language on SCS-or even an outright omissions of this particular issue- might have raised fundamental questions regarding the willingness of ASEAN to jointly stand up to the adventurism of China in SCS, where Beijing has built the artificial islands as well as raised its military footprints lately. Among these states of ASEAN only Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are direct claimants in the SCS disputes. Indonesia has lately encountered challenges with illegal fishing activities of China in its exclusion economic zone, but doesnt recognize the dispute with China. [5] The ASEAN seems unwilling and unable to stand up to China. The negotiations between China with ASEAN on the Code of Conduct for the SCS have dragged into their thirteenth year. China, at the same time, has undertaken an enormous land reclamation campaign to alter the status quo in SCS, leaving critics to lament the inability of ASEAN to form a united policy toward China. [6] The ambiguity regarding the rise of China remains a black sheep in the in Southeast Asia integration. Even though ASEAN had plans to achieve economic pillar of building a regional community by 2015, integration on political-security pillar remained gradual, partially as a result of ASEAN principles of non-interferences and non-confrontational haggling that slow consensus building. [7] The continuation of same policies by ASEAN towards China since 1990s has remained unsuccessful in keeping China from pushing Asian region towards instability as well as threatening the integration of ASEAN. For instance, China compelled a confrontation with Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal only 9 days prior to a round of Code of Conduct consultations in the year 2014, China demonstrated it had little concern for the goal of a cooperative regional order set by ASEAN. What has China got to do with the lack of consensus in ASEAN and how does that relate to the South China Sea dispute(s)? What has China got to do with the lack of consensus in ASEAN? China has exploited the divisions among the members of ASEAN and subsequently applied economic pressure, both negative and positive, to keep the economies from reaching a consensus on the maritime security in their individual backyard. Further, weak leadership on security as well as political issues has left ASEAN without a united approach on the aggression of China in SCS. This remains a fundamental reason why ASEAN stays divided on China. There is no leading economy to overcome political, cultural, and economic variances and forge an overarching consensus. [8] The leadership in ASEAN following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis remained extremely weak or absent at all making China to rapidly force divisions among the ASEAN members. Thailand and Singapore have offered restrained leadership on economic matters, but the ability of Thailand to perform such a key role has weakened because of Thailands internal troubles. China has exploited the absence of core leader to its advantage particularly lack of strong internal mechanisms in ASEAN to mitigate differences among the members to facilitate the lack of consensus in ASEAN. China, for example, has taken this advantage and allowed many ASEAN members to pursue different bilateral actions as well as policies which are extremely at odds with the ASEAN-centric approach to the regional matters. China is at the center of shaping the ASEANs strategic environment than ASEAN itself due the lack of strong ASEAN leadership. It is proclaimed that Chinese diplomacy had triumphed over Japan and the US stands out. It is argued that China has succeeded in splitting ASEAN bloc. Issues like the PCA ruling failed to be integrated into any statement/agreements as Cambodia came out to support China strongly. The Tokyo and Washington demands that the PCA decision be accepted were never passed. On the contrary, the position of Cambodia that acted as spokesperson of China to call for bilateral negotiation carried the day. Based on these sorts of examinations, it is apparent that ASEAN nations are never the protagonists. Instead, China, Japan and the US are treated as the major players in accounting of whatever they have in the store for ASEAN nations that are usually framed as if the lack agency. However, this remains a misguided state of thinking. The ASEAN individual nations have independent choices to make. [9] Whether or not the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting integrates a joint statement on the decision of PCAs South China Sea, this is never about a national being compelled by Japan, the US or China; it is the policy that has been chosen by ASEAN. The real reason is that Southeast Asia has been the focal point of the power wrangle between China and the United States. Accordingly, when China has made forays into this focal point (South China Sea) on the basis of Chinas individual realism, ASEAN has been in awkward position thereby finding it challenging to cope as an organization. Further, while individual Southeast Asian economies could still cope with the United States or China openly employing logic of territorial expansion, on the surface such arguments have concerned rules-oriented concepts like the rule of law/freedom of navigation. Accordingly, it is increasingly hard for ASEAN to respond more efficiently and effectively. Simply put, whereas ASEAN seems to be a forum for deliberation, its structure impedes it from really generating a consensus/conclusion. This is the reason moving forward and not merely at the Foreign Ministers Meeting but at the broad array meeting- differing perception will continue of how ASEAN is tac kling such a Chinese realism internally. This is further evident to recognize the fault lines in the internal structure of ASEAN. This endured attention on a cross-section of variances is inevitable in its individual manner. However, even where there is an ongoing attention on rifts within ASEAN, they shall be in the context of restrained issues; as a whole there shall be an even firmer need for ASEAN to work as it has previously, which is to arrive at consensus. This further underscores the need for strengthening partnerships with additional-regional economies that back ASEAN. How does that relate to the South China Sea dispute(s)? The interferences by China that has impeded the consensus in ASEAN has a close relationship to the SCS disputes. For example, Chinas has a close ties with Cambodia that had to support it at the meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers held in Phnom Penh in July. This caused the dispute since Cambodias support to China ensured that the demands by Vietnam and Philippines were shelved. The two countries wanted the final communique to reflect their concerns over the series of incidents in SCS saves to China illegal activities and behavior. Philippines and Vietnam wanted the final communique to include Scarborough Shoal as well as various cable cutting incidents that involved Vietnamese-chartered ships. Having been influenced by China, Cambodia that held the ASEAN Chair and that has created close economic as well as political ties with China saves to land of strong leadership in ASEAN allowing China to influence it into such bilateral policies, declined arguing that such incidents amounted to bilateral disputes. [10] This led to failure by States on any attempts to reach a compromise on the SCS activities among the ASEAN foreign ministers. Accordingly, and for the first time since ASEAN inception in 1967, the organization failed to issue a final communique in 2012. Cambodia remained highly criticized for such truculence and further accused of having acted at the Chinas behest in order to secure continued assistance economically. Such a fiasco, was argued by Singapores foreign minister (K Shanmugam) had caused ASEANs credibility a severe dent while and hence Cambodias actions called ASEANs centrality into question. Cambodias actions public as well as embarrassingly revealed the lack of ASEAN solidarity over the SCS. This above examination reveals clearly that the lack of consensus in ASEAN is all about the disputes of SCS where China wants to undertake its illegal activities and behaviors by ensuring that there is internal division and lack of solidarity in ASEAN to shelve any issues of mentioning the SCS matters in its communique. China has succeeded in creating division in ASEAN by engaging directly into bilateral policies with ASEAN individual members in exchange of support economically and even politically so as to ensure that it has the backing of some member states of ASEAN to bar consensus as it did in the year 2012. Such interferences and weakening of the ASEAN by China has seen many disputes sprouting including the dispute between Philippines v. China on SCS where the International Court (PAC) has since delivered its ruling in favor of Philippines on most questions as outlined above. China thus wants to get support among the ASEAN members to illegally allow itself to continue harming others that it is various disputes. References Ba, A. D. (2003). China and ASEAN: renavigating relations for a 21st-century Asia. Asian Survey, 43(4), 622-647. Buszynski, L. (2003). ASEAN, the declaration on conduct, and the South China Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 343-362. Buszynski, L., Sazlan, I. (2007). Maritime claims and energy cooperation in the South China Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 29(1), 143-171. Chen, L. K., Liu, L. K., Woo, J., Assantachai, P., Auyeung, T. W., Bahyah, K. S., ... Lee, J. S. (2014). Sarcopenia in Asia: consensus report of the Asian Working Group for Sarcopenia. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 15(2), 95-101. Chong, F. (2012). South China sea breaches ASEAN. Asia Today International, 30(4), 5. Halper, S. (2010). 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